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ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
F-FDTL FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste
FALINTIL Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FRETILIN Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente
GDP Gross Domestic Product
SIO Social Impact Organisation
TAF The Asia Foundation
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNTL Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e
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III. About the Country Insights Labs Series 
The Institute for Societal Leadership conducted a series of eleven Country Insights 
Labs (CILs) in select Southeast Asian cities between June 2014 and June 2015. 
Each CIL aimed to uncover the critical social and environmental issues facing 
leaders from business, government and civil society in a given country and frame 
the underlying causes behind each issue within the country’s context. The study 
identified emerging trends in Southeast Asia and has since directed further re-
search toward interconnected social and environmental issues shared among 
countries in the region. 
Additionally, ISL research staff investigated the day-to-day organisational chal-
lenges faced by social impact organisations (SIOs) in each Southeast Asian coun-
try. We broadly defined an SIO as any organisation with the capacity to contribute 
to the betterment of communities. These included, but were not limited to, phil-
anthropic organisations, corporate foundations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), activist groups, social enterprises and impact investors. Interviews fo-
cussed on challenges associated with funding models, human resources, tax in-
centives, legal frameworks and government registration processes. In total, re-
search staff interviewed 237 organisations and 293 individuals, including govern-
ment officials, business leaders, philanthropists, NGO workers, social entrepre-
neurs, media professionals and academics. The interviews themselves consisted of 
questions relating to organisational history, operations, strategic outlook, cross-
sector collaboration, leadership and country context.  1
The Institute did not intend the CIL series to be exhaustive or to produce statisti-
cally significant data. On the contrary, the series was a qualitative study that em-
ployed interviews and market insights as a means of understanding an increasing-
ly complex landscape. As one of the world’s most diverse regions, Southeast Asia 
is home to an array of cultures, languages, religions and economic levels of devel-
opment. At the cornerstone of each country study is a belief that workable solu-
tions and partnerships depend on an awareness of how each country’s unique 
context relates to its social issues.
The ISL research team conducted interviews in Dili between 15–16 May 2014. 
 For a list of sample questions, see section VI. 1
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IV. Timor-Leste (East Timor) 
A. Historical Background 
Timor-Leste, Asia’s newest nation, is located in 
Southeast Asia, on the southernmost edge of the 
Indonesian archipelago. The country was 
colonised by the Portuguese for over 450 years, 
occupied by the Indonesians for 24 years and 
administered by the United Nations for two and a 
half years. As a nation, Timor-Leste has had a very 
traumatic birth.  
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was first 
declared on 28 November 1975 when Portugal 
gave up control of its colonial holdings. Nine days 
after the national flag was raised, Indonesia in-
vaded and annexed the territory. Throughout the 
Indonesian occupation, Timorese resistance 
forces led an armed struggle against the Indone-
sian army for the restoration of national indepen-
dence. This resulted in a protracted and bloody 
24-year conflict during which an estimated 
102,000 Timorese died, amidst a backdrop of 
arbitrary detention, torture, forced displacement 
and gender-based violence. 
In August 1999, within the context of the Asian 
economic crisis, Indonesia proposed a referen-
dum to offer the Timorese a choice between au-
tonomy and independence. 78.5 percent of the 
population voted for independence from Indone-
sia. The announcement of the voting results was 
followed by a surge of violence and destruction 
on the part of anti-independence militias. In the 
end, thousands of Timorese were killed or injured, 
and more than 500,000 were displaced.   2
In September 1999, the UN Security Council au-
thorised an Australian-led International Force to 
restore peace and security under Chapter 7 of the 
UN Charter. A UN Transitional Administration was 
established to administer the territory, with the 
mandate to build a state from scratch.   
Despite the presence of peacekeepers, ongoing 
violence against journalists, peacekeepers and 
civilians continued throughout 2000. Humanitari-
an agencies involved themselves in relief efforts, 
protection and distribution of food to the dis-
placed and monitored human rights violation.  
A transitional government was formed in 2001, 
and in August of that year, thousands of voters in 
East Timor turned out to vote for the 88 members 
of the constituent assembly and established the 
country's first parliament. In April 2002, indepen-
dence leader Kay Rala "Xanana" Gusmao won the 
presidency by a landslide victory, becoming Tim-
or-Leste's first president. The government drew 
up a national development strategy and plan, 
including the formation of a police force from an 
amalgamation of young recruits and Timorese 
who had previously served in the Indonesian po-
lice. A new defence force was also formed, half of 
which comprised those who had been in armed 
resistance. The United Nations Development Pro-
gramme assumed principal responsibility for the 
judiciary and law-making. 
From the standpoint of humanitarian aid and in-
ternational support, a second phase of recon-
struction and development followed and efforts 
were focused on poverty reduction, water and 
sanitation provision, vocational skills training, 
education, health and literacy promotion. 
Security remained precarious, even while the UN 
started winding down its presence in 2005. Ten-
sions between the police and neglected armed 
forces precipitated a new conflict that resulted in 
an outbreak of gang violence in 2006. Prime Min-
ister Alkatiri’s decision to sack more than 500 from 
the military prompted demonstrations and ten-
sions took on an ethno-political character. Accusa-
tions were hurled at westerners (those living in 
the west part of the country) in Timor-Leste for not 
contributing to the fight for independence as 
much as the easterners had. 150,000 Timorese 
(15 percent of the population then) had to seek 
refuge in makeshift camps. Both the police and 
military, the two public institutions tasked with 
 D. Y. Coleman, East Timor: 2014 Country Review (Houston, USA: Country Watch, 2014).2
 5
providing security, perpetrated rampant crime 
and lawlessness. This prompted the United Na-
tions Security Council to set up a new peacekeep-
ing force to restore stability.  
In February 2008, a rebel group staged an unsuc-
cessful attack against President Jose Ramos-Hor-
ta, a well respected leader of the Timorese resis-
tance who was also recipient of the 1996 Nobel 
Peace Prize. The ringleader, Major Alfredo Reina-
do was killed in the attack and the majority of the 
rebels surrendered to the government in April 
2008.  
The 2006 civil unrest revealed deep-seated social, 
economic and governance challenges that lay 
beneath the surface of Timorese society since 
independence – problems such as the high num-
ber of rural and urban unemployed, inadequate 
infrastructure, rapid population growth, weak 
public sector, limited service capacity, fragile state 
institutions and weak governance. The crisis also 
set Timor-Leste back by several decades.   3
Post-2006, the government has taken measures to 
resettle the people,  reconstruct the economy and 
stabilise the nation. The early adoption of prudent 
fiscal and monetary policies contributed to low 
inflation and accelerating economic growth. 
While the country's large petroleum wealth offers 
the potential for a prosperous future, Timor-Leste 
remains one of the least developed countries in 
the world, with about 50 percent of the popula-
tion still living in poverty.  
 E. Lothe and G. Peake, ‘Addressing symptoms but not causes: stabilisation and humanitarian action in Timor-Leste’, Disasters 34.3 (2010): 3
427–443.
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Timor-Leste By Numbers 
Official Name:    Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (2002 – present) 
Capital:      Dili 
Area:     14,874 sq km 
Population:    1.2 million (country); 180,000 (Dili) 
Ethnic Groups:    Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), Papuan, a small Chinese minority 
Religion:    Roman Catholic (96.9%), Protestant (2.2%), Muslim (0.3%), other (0.6%) 
Language:   Tetum (official), Portuguese (official), Indonesian, English 
  
Currency:    United States Dollar 
GDP (PPP):   $25.41 billion [2013 est.]  
GDP Per Capita (PPP): $21,400 [2013 est.] 
GDP Real Growth Rate: 8.1% [2013 est.] 
Labour Force:   Agriculture (64%), Industry (10%), Services (26%) 
Literacy:    58.3% (whole); 63.6% (male); 53% (female) 
Life Expectancy:  67.39 years (whole); 65.87 years (male); 69.01 years  
     (female) [2014 est., 3rd] 
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
B. Current Challenges 
❖ A fragmented system of authority. Post-2006, 
the path towards national development and 
restoration has not been a smooth one for the 
government. While good policies have been es-
tablished, there remains an implementation gap 
due to Timor-Leste’s checkered past, the pres-
ence of multi-state and non-state actors as well as 
the multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic nature of the 
population. 
While the plan was to train the Timorese to run a 
self-sufficient government, during the UN Admin-
istration the success of skills transfer and capacity 
development was limited. The government re-
mained dependent on foreign advice and as-
sistance for many of the tasks of administration, 
particularly at senior levels. To many within the 
Timorese community, foreign intervention and 
help were often levied at the expense of local 
knowledge and practices. That non-state Timo-
rese parties were not included led to the Timo-
rese having difficulty in accepting some interna-
tionally-led interventions. There exists a rift be-
tween decision makers and the community due 
mainly to the clash between old and new value 
systems. The new system uses the structures 
adopted with international help while the old sys-
tem relies on local and community leaders to de-
termine the rule of law.  
For many who had given their lives to decades of 
resistance and fighting for independence, the 
struggle is not over. Veterans of the resistance 
want recognition and compensation for past ef-
forts and sacrifices. They question the current 
constitutional order, and their rallying call is for 
“real independence”—a call which is often linked 
to demands for the withdrawal of the UN or for-
mer anti-independence politicians from govern-
ment.  With the veterans, there have also been 4
expressions of disappointment with a post-con-
flict settlement that did not live up to their high 
expectations of independence, which was meant 
to usher in a new era of plenty and equality. The 
newly-formed national armed forces (F-FDTL) 
conceives itself as the mantle-bearer of the FAL-
INTIL, or the military wing of the independence 
party FRETILIN, and perpetuates the language of 
continuous struggle. Like many of the non-state 
groups, it draws upon the legacy of the struggle 
to claim for itself a special role in developing the 
future of the nation. 
As a signal of impatience and resolve to continue 
the good fight, veteran organisations have at 
times taken things into their own hands and set 
up their own funds to provide pensions and other 
services for members who receive no or insuffi-
cient state support. While state crackdowns on 
the activities of non-state actors have been mostly 
framed in the language of re-asserting state sov-
ereignty, political expediency often seems to play 
a greater role in determining which groups’ state-
like activities are seen as a threat and which ones 
are tacitly allowed to continue. The government 
has been observed to be partial and tolerant to-
wards such activism in an attempt to ‘buy peace’. 
The outcome of such a stance is a fragmented 
system of authority and a reinforcement of the 
fact that the centrality of the struggle narrative is 
not a debate about the past, but also one about 
access to economic benefits, social standing and 
political power in the present. 
❖ A weak social compact. It has been observed 
that following the struggle for independence, a 
technocratic approach to building the structures 
of state overshadowed the need for unifying ap-
proaches to reconciliation and the creation of a 
sense of citizenship among the Timorese. For the 
majority of the population, the adoption of Por-
tuguese as the official language, the language of 
a small and older elite in the country, in itself 
worked against the nurturing of a sense of citi-
zenship as well as the opportunity to embrace 
locally held ideals and ideas of community and 
justice.  
The principal driver of national unity was the resis-
tance during Indonesian occupation. That sense 
of unity flagged after independence was restored. 
The influx of international aid workers and relief 
agencies post-1999 changed the dynamics for 
the Timorese. While international relief and de-
velopment work was important to build a nation, 
the downside of it was that foreigners came mere-
 H. Myrttinen, ‘Resistance, symbolism and the language of stateness in Timor-Leste’, Oceania 83.3 (2013): 208–220. 4
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ly to fulfil a function or mission. There was little 
interaction with the community and their lack of 
interest and time for local history, culture and tra-
dition showed. They also perpetuated the as-
sumption that the system and institutions that 
function best are those created in the image of 
those dominant in Western countries. In this re-
gard, Western aid workers appeared to Timorese 
to act as the new colonisers and invaders.  This 5
view is further reinforced as many Timorese lived 
in the remnants of their destroyed houses while 
shops and restaurants catered for international 
expatriates at prices which Timorese could not 
afford, creating a dual economy. The disparity is 
heightened when we take into consideration the 
sense of betrayal felt among many former student 
activists (now adults) who had joined the resis-
tance and who had little opportunity for educa-
tion after independence. These adults were 
forced to return to subsistence farming in order to 
survive, even though some had never farmed 
before. Such tensions within the fledgling nation 
necessarily led to a weak social compact. Ten 
years from independence, the Timorese people 
still feel their government has not delivered. 
Those who had sacrificed themselves in the war 
had been forgotten, there were no attempts to 
help individual families locate loved ones who 
disappeared during the war, fuel prices remain 
high and there seems to be no signs of their eco-
nomic conditions improving in spite of the oil and 
gas reserves and revenue. 
❖ Contestation of languages and the risk to social 
capital. The struggle for nationhood in Timor-
Leste can be seen as essentially a struggle for the 
recognition of the country’s unique and diverse 
ethno-cultural identity, which is a product of its 
particular colonial history.  The nation of Timor-6
Leste consists of 15 distinct ethno-linguistic 
groups who speak at least 16 Austronesian and 
Papuan languages and their sub-varieties. The 
idea that the country’s citizens share one civic 
identity is currently more notional than real.  7
When the declaration was made at independence 
that the Portuguese language and culture was 
part of the identity of the Timorese, it created a 
significant sense of alienation for the Indonesian-
educated generation. During the Indonesian oc-
cupation, Portuguese was the language of the 
resistance. The decision to adopt Portuguese 
(rather than English or Bahasa Indonesia) reflect-
ed the preferences of a political leadership large-
ly educated during the Portuguese period.  8
The fact, however, remains that at independence, 
only 5 percent understood the Portuguese lan-
guage and this was confined to the elites, which 
meant that the majority of Timorese were margin-
alised from official Timorese culture.  Even 9
though Tetum was popularised as a national lan-
guage through its use in the Catholic Mass during 
the Indonesian occupation, it was not the lan-
guage of choice due to a relatively unsophisticat-
ed lexicon.  
From a sociological standpoint, a common lan-
guage is critical to the relationship between gov-
ernment and civil society. Social change requires 
engagement especially within the widespread 
rural community of Timor-Leste. A common lan-
guage ensures that people are included as active 
citizens, rather than excluded as lesser or non-
citizens. 
The Timorese leadership’s adoption of the Por-
tuguese language has not been comfortably re-
ceived by either the younger generation educat-
ed in Indonesian (the language of the oppressors) 
or the majority of Tetum-speaking population 
who continue to live according to traditional val-
ues.  
In realisation of this, while the school system has 
officially adopted a Portuguese curriculum at in-
 A. Wigglesworth, ‘The growth of civil society in Timor- Leste: Three moments of activism’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 43.1 (2013), 51–74.5
 M. Leach, ‘Timor-Leste in 2013: Charting its own Course’, Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 337–352.6
 R.O. Muggah, O. Jütersonke, R. Murray, E. Rees and J. Scambary, Urban violence in an urban village: A case study of Dili, Timor-Leste 7
(Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2010). 
 J. Macalister, ‘Language policies, language planning and linguistic landscapes in Timor-Leste’, Language Problems & Language Planning 8
36.1 (2012): 25–45. 
 H. Hill and J. M. Saldanha, ’ The Key Issues’. In East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation, eds. H. Hill and J. M. 9
Saldanha (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001).
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dependence, changes are underway to ‘indi-
genise’ parts of the compulsory school curriculum 
and make textbooks more relevant to Timor-
Leste’s social context. A mother tongue literacy 
agenda is being developed to improve early liter-
acy outcomes by teaching the younger grades in 
local Timorese home languages.  Efforts have also 
been made to make textbooks available in Tetum 
at the primary level. 
The contestation of languages will remain an is-
sue as Timor-Leste attempts to build social as well 
as economic capital, and the government’s re-
sourcefulness in handling the issue of language 
and national identity will continue to be tested in 
the coming years. 
❖ A shaky economic foundation. During the colo-
nial era, education was available only to the chil-
dren of the elites. The Portuguese did not devel-
op the land nor the people of the small outpost of 
their empire. Instead, they massively exploited its 
natural resources, such as sandalwood and teak. 
The Indonesians continued this exploitation, and 
a sizeable portion of Timor-Leste’s forest cover 
was depleted during Indonesian occupation. The 
Indonesians also destroyed formal institutions 
and traditional structures of authority in East Tim-
or, for instance, with the burning of the sacred 
homes (uma luliks) of the villagers. They exploited 
the petroleum resources in the Timor Sea (in con-
junction with Australia), and corruption was rife 
during those times, with violence being used as 
the primary means of conflict resolution.  
Timor-Leste has been fortunate to have had dis-
covered new petroleum reserves since 2005. The 
country is proud to be debt-free, and the gov-
ernment relies on petroleum revenue to fund its 
annual budget. Income from petroleum compris-
es 95 percent of government revenue. Other rev-
enues are derived from taxes and fees from ser-
vices such as customs and passports as well as 
donor contributions made directly to the national 
budget.  
Timor-Leste’s economic foundation remains shaky 
as income from petroleum can vary from year to 
year. Making projections is difficult due to 
changes in oil prices and production plans as well 
as the fluctuating value of the US dollar. The more 
pertinent point is that while petroleum reserves 
amount to close to US$20 billion, the non-oil GDP 
per capita is only US$367 overall, and US$150 in 
rural areas. The government knows it needs to 
place greater emphasis on developing its non-oil 
economy. The Timorese economy is currently not 
diversified and the Timorese are heavily reliant on 
imports of goods and services such as cement, 
fuel, steel and other consumer products. 
Human resource development is key to Timor-
Leste’s economic sustainability. Even within the 
petroleum industry, there is a dearth of Timorese 
with the knowledge, skills and experience to 
manage the current scale of operations. There is 
still a strong reliance on services provided by the 
Norwegian government for advice and assistance. 
Outside of the petroleum industry, more is re-
quired to raise the skills level of the people. As of 
this writing, the unemployment rate is 8.9 percent, 
and the youth unemployment rate is 23 percent. 
41 percent of the the population live in poverty 
and have no access to quality education and 
healthcare. Adding to these statistics, more than 
50 percent of the population were under the age 
of 15 . Population growth in Timor-Leste is now 
one of the highest in the region. This does not 
bode well, as a high growth rate will mean dra-
matic increases in spending on social services 
such as health and education year on year and a 
greater burden on petroleum revenue and re-
serves. 
Primary healthcare remains an area of challenge. 
A 2013 Timor-Leste Food and Nutrition Survey 
indicated ‘very high’ rates of chronic and acute 
malnutrition among children. The prevalence of 
stunting was 50.2 percent, and 37.7 percent of 
children aged 0-59 months were underweight. 11 
percent of children experienced wasting and 1.9 
percent experienced severe wasting due to acute 
malnutrition. The United Nations has instituted a 
zero-hunger project, which includes free lunches 
in school. International NGOs, such as World Vi-
sion, have also been very active in ensuring that 
parental education goes hand in hand with the 
provision of milk powder and other nutrients for 
children. 
Timor-Leste is subjected to severe drought and 
floods. This affects three quarters of the popula-
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tion, which overwhelmingly relies on subsistence 
farming to survive. UNDP found that 64 percent of 
the population suffer from food insecurity. The 
extent to which Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund can 
be used to develop the necessary infrastructure 
that may promote the country’s socio-economic 
development will depend on whether or not eco-
nomic growth is sufficiently inclusive.  This will 10
have to entail an emphasis on agriculture, which is 
the main source of income for 80 percent of the 
population, the strengthening of social protection 
mechanisms, the enhancement of productivity 
capabilities, employment generation, particularly 
for women and the young, and the promotion of 
financial inclusiveness. It would also be important 
to make the shift from subsistence farming to 
market-oriented farming, as increasing agricultur-
al sector productivity can further alleviate poverty. 
❖ The importance of being ASEAN. International 
interventions in Timor-Leste’s development pre- 
and post-2006 have been largely multidimen-
sional and multilateral, involving the reinforce-
ment of soldiers, police officers, humanitarian aid, 
development agencies and technical assistance 
from different countries. The adoption of Por-
tuguese, although controversial locally, had been 
strategic in giving the Timorese government ac-
cess to European Union funds through Portugal. 
The current Timorese leaders, as a result of grow-
ing political experience and increasing wealth 
from oil and gas over the past few years, are reso-
lute in working towards securing their country’s 
position in the regional and global order. 
Throughout the Indonesian occupation, the na-
tionalist political leadership promoted close ties 
with the Melanesian states that strongly support-
ed Timor-Leste’s struggle for independence.  11
Timor-Leste would like to be a member of the 
Pacific Islands Forum. However, as ASEAN rules 
do not permit double membership, the govern-
ment has expressed their preference for ASEAN 
membership and are working on bilateral rela-
tions with individual ASEAN countries in a bid to 
be fully accepted into the ASEAN economic 
community. According to former President 
Ramos-Horta, joining ASEAN is a means for Tim-
or-Leste to attain not so much an economic um-
brella but security. It is also an expression of Tim-
or-Leste’s willingness to cooperate with Indonesia 
in a regional organisation that promotes the 
norms of non-intervention.  
Timor-Leste filed an application for ASEAN mem-
bership in 2011. Requirements include a demon-
stration of progress in socio-cultural, political and 
economic fields. Benchmarks would include the 
ability to allocate enough budget to participate in 
at least 1,000 world meetings and host at least 
100 international events annually. The application 
also depends on the nation’s progress in develop-
ing infrastructure. 
Roberto Sarmento de Oliveira Soares, Secretary 
of State for ASEAN Affairs has acknowledged that 
the economy is the main challenge for Timor-
Leste because it cannot compete in a free market, 
as ASEAN members do. But he believes that by 
accelerating development in areas such as fish-
ing, marine tourism and farming, the country will 
be able to hit its targets. According to Foreign 
Minister Jose Luis Guterres, there is plenty of po-
tential for expansion to other member states, 
since 80 percent of Timor-Leste’s current trade is 
with Indonesia and Singapore. There is also great 
potential presented by its under-managed oil and 
gas reserves as well as other natural resources, 
such as gold. Optimising any of these would call 
for the participation of ASEAN members. 
III. Insights from the Dili Lab 
❖ Language remains a critical impediment to 
Timor-Leste’s development. 
In the earlier section, we drew attention to how 
the choice of Portuguese as the national language 
had caused a rift between civil society and policy 
makers as well as between government and the 
people. Tetum has high cultural value, and Por-
tuguese, as the official language, advantages 
 S.H.B. Harmadi and R.A. Gomes, ‘Developing Timor-Leste's Non-Oil Economy Challenges and Prospects’, Journal of Southeast Asian 10
Economies 30.3 (2013), 309–321. 
 B.S. Sahin, ’Timor-Leste’s foreign policy: Securing state identity in the post-independence period’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian 11
Affairs 2 (2014): 3–25.
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those with links to the country’s colonial past. The 
government of Timor-Leste is fully aware of the 
conundrum that language issues have caused. 
However, there are currently no plans for reform-
ing the language policy. The political leadership 
feels the need to retain the current policy to main-
tain unity among the people. Upsetting the cur-
rent equilibrium by introducing a different official 
language would likely induce societal discontent 
that could potentially fracture an already tenuous 
peace. 
From the perspective of countries that are willing 
to render help to the fledgling nation of Timor-
Leste, the use of Tetum and Portuguese as lan-
guages of choice has led to much difficulty in ef-
fectively aiding the Timorese by way of technolo-
gy or knowledge transfer. In our various meetings 
on Timor-Leste, language constraints emerged as 
an issue time and again. Added to the fact that 
systems and processes are in need of streamlin-
ing, the confounding factor of language has also 
made it difficult for Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDIs) to take root. The language issue is also a 
barrier in terms of the provision of training in pub-
lic administration and public policy that countries 
such as  Australia and Singapore could provide 
(especially with reference to the new economic 
zone in Oecusse that the government is keen to 
develop).  
Timor-Leste’s Education Ministry is in the midst of 
a review, and reforms are underway for a more 
child-centred pedagogy. The Ministry has already 
introduced English into the curriculum at the pri-
mary and secondary levels. There are plans to 
enlist trainers from abroad who could act as 
teacher-mentors across all provinces to train 
teachers in pedagogy. The Ministry will be hard 
pressed to find  more than two hundred volun-
teers needed, as local teachers will have to be 
taught in Portuguese or Tetum. Apart from volun-
teers from Brazil and Portugal who are able to 
speak Portuguese, it would be difficult to attract 
help that would have been more readily available 
in English-speaking countries, such as Australia, 
the United States, New Zealand and Singapore. 
❖ Foreign-backed social programmes must leave 
room to address post-traumatic stress disorder 
and the horrors of past conflicts.  
There are several challenges to building a sus-
tainable economy and stable nation in Timor-
Leste. More pragmatic diplomats take a long-term 
view of the potential of the new nation. The evolu-
tion to a stable economy cannot be rushed and 
simply willed into being. There is a keen aware-
ness that Timor-Leste has only recently emerged 
from decades of conflict and is desperately in 
need of systems, processes and the basic in-
frastructure for state building. Much needs to be 
done to lay the groundwork because the popula-
tion remains polarised—there are both veterans of 
the resistance who maintain that independence is 
not quite complete, as well as victims of strife and 
violence suffering from post-traumatic stress dis-
order. 
Repeated bouts of violence in Timor-Leste’s re-
cent past and a persistent sense of injustice have 
had a lasting mental health impact on the Timo-
rese people and recovery may require more than 
therapeutic interventions. The mental health of 
the Timorese may pose as important an impedi-
ment to economic progress as the economic 
foundations discussed earlier. Widespread mental 
health problems are the result of exposure to con-
flict, human rights violations and atrocities. The 
general population still lacks access to livelihoods 
and justice. Researchers have argued that frustra-
tion and disappointment with a failure to achieve 
social justice in the form of economic opportuni-
ties, social stability and good governance are typ-
ical of many post-conflict societies. The restora-
tion of a sense of justice will be a slow and 
piecemeal process, best advanced by a multi-sec-
toral, grassroots and participatory approach. 
Mental health services in Timor-Leste, along with 
other infrastructure and social services, are cur-
rently weak. There were no specific mental health 
services in the country prior to 1999. In a 2008 
assessment that employed the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee’s (IASC) Guidelines on Men-
tal Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency 
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Settings, researchers noted that the country 
needed 300 mental health workers to provide 
appropriate care, but had only 15 at that time. 
The Timorese leadership may be resolute and 
committed to clean and honest dealings and a 
strong education system. However, an awareness 
of the psychological state of the Timorese and, 
more importantly, the post-traumatic stress disor-
der prevalent among families will be crucial to 
ensure that healing and restoration can take 
place. 
Being especially communal and spiritual in orien-
tation, the Timorese expect some form of closure 
to the horrors of war they had witnessed. Yet ac-
cording to the 2013 Timor-Leste Law & Justice 
Survey published by The Asia Foundation (TAF), 
there has been very little progress in the pursuit 
of justice against defendants for past atrocities. 
Instead, TAF researchers argue that events such 
as the 2009 release and repatriation of Indone-
sian citizen Maternus Bere, indicted for crimes 
such as the killing of more than 30 unarmed civil-
ians and three priests in Timor-Leste on 6 Sep-
tember 1999, only fuel the fires of frustration. 
While the Timorese justice system has become 
more formalised in recent years, including a ‘mo-
bile courts’ initiative, confidence in the govern-
ment to resolve disputes, legal matters and past 
crimes has been low. 
NGOs working in Timor-Leste are often impatient 
with the lack of drive and initiative on the part of 
the people they are trying to help. An under-
standing of the complexity of dealing with a post-
conflict nation will engender patience in helping 
the Timorese to help themselves. According to 
one senior diplomat, ‘when approaching Timor-
Leste, it is important to have empathy for them. 
They have been through hell, yet they are not 
bitter. They genuinely want to move on.’ 
❖ More foreign aid is not necessarily better. 
The UNDP is still trying very hard to play a helpful 
role in the social development of the country. 
Non-invasive help such as the establishment of 
youth and English language centres may very well 
give the people the boost they need to take own-
ership of their own lives. Direct intervention and 
coercion are unlikely to be productive. 
While appreciative of international assistance thus 
far, Timorese officials are optimistic, confident and 
eager to take charge of their own destiny. They 
feel they have come of age.  
To quote current Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, 
who has openly expressed his opinion that the 
UN has overstayed its welcome in the country in a 
speech made to the diplomatic community in Dili 
on 17 May 2011, ‘We know what we want, and the 
state of Timor-Leste knows what its people want.’ 
His statement clearly demonstrated the growing 
discomfort among the Timorese government with 
the continued presence of the UN and other in-
ternational capacity development agencies since 
1999 as well as its confidence in its own ability to 
take full control of the country’s governmental 
and institutional affairs.    12
It appears best then, to leave Timor-Leste to de-
velop its own institutional muscle slowly but sure-
ly. It is also critical for the government to own its 
own citizenry, build a strong social compact and 
develop a national identity among its very frac-
tured populace. 
❖ Timor-Leste’s greatest asset is its youth. 
  
In a brief exchange with Prime Minister Gusmao 
while he was in transit in Singapore, he indicated 
that he had high hopes pinned on the youth of 
Timor-Leste. The PM was confident that the foun-
dation laid for the education of the young are 
sound and that the National University of Timor-
Leste is also growing from strength to strength 
through various partnerships with Asian and 
Western nations. Currently, faculty from the med-
ical school at National University of Singapore 
offer support and help to students at the National 
University of East Timor (UNTL). Countries such as 
Australia have also been generous in awarding 
scholarships for bright Timorese students to study 
abroad. What Gusmao was keen to see was the 
 Sahin, B. S. ‘Timor-Leste’s foreign policy: Securing state identity in the post-independence period’, 3–25.12
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setting up of more English Language centres in 
collaboration with universities in Timor-Leste as 
well as leadership development programmes to 
expose Timorese youth to global and national 
issues and strengthen their competencies. 
  
According to Index Mundi, the median age for 
the Timorese population is 18.5 years. 42.4 per-
cent of the population is below the age of four-
teen.  The new generation of youth in Timor-13
Leste has grown up in an era without the threat 
and conflict of war. They are eager to learn, are 
driven, and have imbibed the values of their el-
ders to contribute to the development of their 
country. If the requisite amount of resources is 
committed to their basic education, and econom-
ic development continues to keep pace with gov-
ernment intentions, there is much potential for 
them to be able to contribute positively to the 
Timorese workforce. 
 'Index Mundi 2014’, accessed 13 Jan 2015, http://www.indexmundi.com/timor-leste/demographics_profile.html.13
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V. List of Organisations Interviewed 
Cocoon Centre. Dili, 16 May 2014. 
Credit Suisse. Singapore, 20 May 2014. 
Department of ASEAN Affairs. Dili, 15 May 2014. 
Fundasun Mahein. Dili, 16 May 2014. 
Heartfriends Manatuto. Dili, 16 May 2014. 
Ministry of Basic Education, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Dili, 15 May 2014. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Singapore, 11 March 2014. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore. Singapore, 14 May 2014. 
United Nations, Office of the Secretary-General. Bangkok, 2014. 
United Nations Development Programme. Dili, 15 May 2014. 
World Vision, Timor-Leste. Dili, 15 May 2014. 
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ORGANISATIONS BY SECTOR
Commercial
1
Government
6
SIO
4 Total Organisations Interviewed: 11 
VI. Questions for Interviewees 
Organisational History  
1) How and why was your organisation established? Is there a founding story? 
2) For international organisations – Why did your organisation decide to enter Timor-Leste?  
Operations  
3) On what projects are you currently working? What would success look like one year from 
 now? Five years from now? 
4) How successful were your past programmes? What is your organisation doing differently 
 from when it first began operations in Timor-Leste? 
5) Do you foresee any upcoming difficulties?  
6) What does your organisation need to make your programmes more effective?  
Strategies  
7) What are your organisation’s goals for the next 3-5 years? How do you plan to meet those 
 goals? 
8) What factors might jeopardise the success of your overall strategy?  
Collaboration  
9) Were there any difficulties or pitfalls in past collaborations? Have any difficulties surfaced in 
 your current collaborations?  
10) Have you collaborated with organisations outside your sector? How could such  
 relationships be improved or facilitated?  
11) Is there any individual or organisation with whom you would like to collaborate but have 
 been unable to do so?  
Human Resources  
12) Do you generally source staff locally or from overseas? Have you had any difficulties finding 
 skilled local staff?  
13) Which professional skills, if any, do local staff currently lack? What do local staff need to  
 succeed in today’s workplace?  
14) How would you evaluate local educational institutions in preparing future employees? Are 
 there private or foreign institutions attempting to fill any gaps?  
Leadership  
15) What does effective leadership—in business, government or civil society— look like to you? 
16) What skills and resources do Timorese leaders need to better serve their society?  
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17) The Institute broadly defines societal leadership as “the practice of creating sustainable  
 value and impact for the betterment of society within one’s sphere of influence.” Are there 
 any remarkable individuals in Timor-Leste whom you would consider a societal leader? 
Sustainability & CSR 
18) Does you organisation have any sustainability guidelines? How did you determine your  
 current guidelines? 
19) Does your organisation engage in any Corporate Social Responsibility  (CSR) initiatives?  
 Have you been able to measure the impact of your organisation’s CSR programmes? 
Funding (for social-sector organisations) 
20) Roughly speaking, how is your organisation currently funded?  
21) How financially self-sustaining is your organisation at the moment? Do you have any plans 
 to lower  dependence on outside funding in the future? 
Context  
22) How does working in Timor-Leste differ from working in other Southeast Asian countries? 
 What does Timor-Leste have in common with the rest of the region?  
23) How do minorities (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) fit into the landscape? Do minorities  
 actively collaborate with the status quo?  
24) Outside of your own organisation’s scope, what are the key problem areas facing  
 Timor-Leste?  
25) How is Timor-Leste different from five years ago? How do you imagine it will change in the 
 next five years?  
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